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Abstract: In this paper I contrast Hayek’s and Luhmann’s treatment of law as a 
complex social system. Through a detailed examination of Hayek’s account of 
law, I criticize the explanatory power of his central distinction between 
spontaneous order and organization. Furthermore, I conclude that its 
application to law leads to different results from the ones derived by Hayek. 
The central failure of Hayek’s failure, however, lies in his identification of 
complex systems with systems of liberal content maximizing individual 
freedom. Indeed, in this way, he can only account for systems-individuals and 
not systems-systems interactions. I introduce Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic 
systems, which I submit, can solve all the mentioned problems and seems a 
much more promising conceptual architecture to grasp social systems in the 
context of a complex society.  
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“Its main theme [general evolutionary theory] is not the unity of 
history as an evolution from a beginning up until the present day. 
It is concerned, far more specifically, with the conditions for 
possible unplanned changes of structure and with the explanation 
of diversification or the increase in complexity.” (Niklas 
Luhmann) 
 
“Does the automobile goes where its steering wheel points at?” 
(Gorbachev) 
 
1. Place and Ends of the Article 
 
 This paper aims at contributing to the recent revival of spontaneous and 
emergent order thinking within social sciences. To this trend, the diffusion of 
evolutionary theory (Darwin 2003, Mayr 2002 and Guttman 2006),2 systems 
theory and sociocybernetics has contributed greatly (Geyer & van der Zouwen 
2001). And yet, the authors employing the Hayekian framework of 
spontaneous orders had paid little or no attention to the developments just 
identified.  
 For example, among others, diZerega (2008: 1) has recently contended 
that “Hayek’s approach lays a solid foundation for a unified science of complex 
order.” Accordingly, he identifies i) the interaction between spontaneous order 
and ii) the interaction between spontaneous orders and instrumental 
organizations as two fundamental research questions to develop in the future. 
 I first develop a critique on its own of Hayek’s account of law. Using it, I 
argue that both spontaneous order and organizations of law can be complex 
systems and therefore Hayek’s distinction loses sight of the largest part of the 
legal phenomena; of law as a complex system. I conclude that Hayek’s basic 
distinction between spontaneous orders and organizations has little explanatory 
power. 
 Moreover, I submit that the literature on emergent orders has failed to 
notice that these are systems related questions. They do not directly relate to 
systems/individuals but systems/systems interactions and therefore cannot be 
adequately captured by a methodological individualism type of account. This 
implies a paradigmatic change: moving from the subject to the system level of 
analysis. 
I illustrate what was mentioned before by comparing Hayek’s 
conceptualization of law with the one offered by Luhmann. I suggest that his 
theory of autopoietic systems presents a much more promising conceptual 
architecture to address such questions in the context of a complex society. 
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The paper offers three distinct sets of contributions. Firstly, I bridge the 
gap between two literatures which so far have not communicated properly. 
Secondly, this links makes explicit the precise limitations of Hayekian doctrine 
that are preventing further progress on emergent orders literature. Finally, I 
extend the study of complex systems to law, a phenomenon that has not 
merited much attention by Hayek’s followers so far more concerned with 
democracy and science (diZerega 1989: 1 with sources). 
 
2. Hayek and Luhmann3 
 
Despite the age of their writings, Hayek and Luhmann are at the 
forefront of research in complex systems and evolutionary theory. They both 
recognize that evolution has brought us a society characterized by complexity, 
gigantic levels of information flow that need to be processed everyday for 
society to keep running. More importantly, they were aware that this level of 
complexity could only have been reached because of the absence of a centralized 
body directing society.4 
That is the first main input of this article. I submit that there is much to 
gain in pairing and comparing Hayek and Luhmann approaches since both 
conceptualize the social problem as the use of information/communication.5 The 
challenge of society is how to cope with increasing levels of complexity without 
breaking down. 
There is, however, a crucial difference which will prove fundamental in 
the economy of my argument. Hayek (1945), faithful to his methodological 
individualism, claims that individuals are the ones who can make the most 
efficient use of information and therefore social systems such as the market 
and the legal one should be designed so as to allow the maximum freedom of 
individuals (Barry 1982: b4).  
Luhmann, on the other hand, jumps one level in the unit of analysis. The 
use of information is not to be studied from the individual but from the system 
standpoint. Put differently, how social systems can reduce the information they 
need to process in order to be able to fulfill their specific function and survive. 
The former studies the use of information by individuals whereas the latter by 
systems. This difference will come with a price that we shall explore later in the 
article. 
In addition, the two authors are also very close when defining the 
function of law. They both sustain that the function of law is the protection of 
expectations so that social life can be less complex.6 Still, there is a much 
revealing difference. Hayek prescribes that not all expectations can be 
protected within a dynamic order. The important thing is that individuals know 
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which expectations are protected so that individual expectations can converge 
and interactions emerge.  
Luhmann makes no judgment on the number of expectations that 
should be protected. His thesis is a different one. We have to accept that law 
consists of its compliance and violation. The more expectations we protect 
through law the more violations will be part of law’s regular working. 
Consequently, law’s function is to guarantee that even if expectations are 
disappointed (e.g. A robs B) individuals still trust those normative expectations 
(Luhmann 2008: 142 ff.). This is important because it prevents individuals from 
the need to learn (reviewing their beliefs) every time normative expectations are 
disappointed; thereby reducing the complexity of social life. 
Finally, both authors reject the idea that society obey to a sort of 
hierarchical principle (Hayek 1982: I 36); that society can be controlled by a 
single authority telling individuals and social systems what to do. Their belief in 
a de-centralized order is, however, not totally coincident. Whereas Hayek 
clearly prioritizes the content of the economic order (based on liberty) whose 
logic all the other ones (like the legal) should mirror (2008: 140-141); Luhmann 
is the theorist of the polycentric society par excellence, defending that each 
system has a logic of its own and follows it autonomously. The convergence of 
values among spontaneous orders that Hayek defends, is simply impossible to 
postulate a priori according to Luhmann’s radical epistemology.  
Still, they both agree on a fundamental conclusion stemming from last 
paragraph’s description: they condemn and suspect steering attempts of society 
by central bodies. Hayek, because it would be, in essence, a way of dis-
coordinating the use of information by individuals affecting the convergence of 
expectations necessary to fuel social life (they fall prey of the illusion that 
central bodies like the State can aggregate and make use of more information 
than individuals: what Hayek called the “constructivism error”). More radically 
Luhmann simply says that there is no reason to believe in the success of such 
interventions. From his systems theoretic perspective, every intervention of 
one system in a different one has to be re-worked/translated in the former’s 
own logic making impossible to predict its final outcome. 
 
3. Hayek’s Conceptualization 
  
In the last chapter, some of Hayek and Luhmann’s similarities and differences 
were presented. The goal was to prepare the reader’s sensibility to the exercise 
that will unfold throughout the whole paper. In this section, I document 
Hayek’s understanding of law as a complex system and update it according to 
modern legal developments. 
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3.1. Spontaneous Order, Organization and Law 
 
Hayek (1982: I 36) introduced evolutionary thinking when researching 
social order by stating very boldly that social order is not and cannot be the 
product of human design. Instead, he emphasized the role of tradition in the 
maintenance and evolution of social order. To such self-correcting, 
decentralized system he assigned the name of spontaneous order.7 According 
to him, money, language, the market and the legal system would constitute 
examples of such.  
Hayek (ibidem: 38) authoritatively held that the most fundamental 
distinction to understand social institutions was the one between spontaneous 
order (cosmos) and organization (taxis). The first emerged without human design 
out of individual actions whereas the latter instrumentally pursued the goals of 
their makers. In the former, individuals determine and fulfill their plans (and 
through their actions they self-correct the global social order) whereas in the 
latter, individuals are functionalized to the organization’s goals. How do these 
categories apply to law and why should we studying them in the context of law 
and not of any other social phenomena, like the economic order, accounted for 
by Hayek? 
Law is the stepping stone of the entire analysis of social order by Hayek. 
In fact, he admits that the spontaneous order of market (and action in general) 
crucially depends on the existence of specific legal arrangements. In his own 
words, law is a “necessary condition for the formation of a spontaneous order 
of actions” (ibidem: 112).8 This raises important problems as we will see in 
detail. It suffices to say, for the time being, that such foundational role assigned 
to law forced Hayek to ascribe it a highly immutable and precise content over 
history. In this way, the explanatory power of Hayek’s theses depends on a 
clear empirical assumption. Of course, his whole theory does not lose its value 
as a counterfactual but, as I submit in this paper, it contributes little to the 
understanding of present day social order. 
Once we acknowledge this foundational role of law, I find it obvious 
that this ought to be our starting point in the study of Hayek’s 
conceptualization of social order. The remaining of the paper should prove the 
benevolence of this choice. 
 When applied to law, spontaneous order and organization name two 
distinct types of order. Law as a spontaneous order can be defined as the set of 
rules of just conduct that in their vast majority emerged/were discovered within 
human interaction and survived the passage of time. These abstract rules of just 
conduct do not impose any purposes of their own over individuals. In different 
words, law would simply provide the framework for individuals to pursue their 
own goals and interests. Seeing law as a spontaneous order in the lines of 
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Hayek implies reducing it to contract, property and criminal law; those rules of 
conduct that tell individuals what they cannot do; not what they have to do 
(Hayek 1982: II 36 and 2008: 124). 
Hayek identified, though, a second type of rules. He called them 
commands.9 Orders issued/made by an authority to advance its own interests and 
goals. In this conception law becomes legislation, the mere product of bodies 
with legislative powers. Law stopped being defined by the content of its rules 
(abstract vs. concrete) but by its source ultimately leading to the identification of 
legislation with law. 
The basic difference at stake is that in the latter case of legislation, the 
individuals serve the purposes/goals of the legislator expressed in rules telling 
them what they should do. Here Hayek’s critique is twofold. First, this is a 
short step to totalitarian regimes since we open up the idea according to which 
there are no limits to what law can regulate. Secondly, by restricting individual 
freedom we are foreclosing individuals’ use of their private information which 
is far more efficient than the one achieved by any central body. We are in this 
way limiting the complexity that social order can achieve by transferring the 
power to define the goals to be pursued from the individual to the community 
(ibidem: 53 speaking of the move from individual to collective freedom). 
 
3.2 Law/Common Law and Legislation/Civil Law 
 
There is more to what was written above. The prominence of law or 
legislation was associated by Hayek to two different legal traditions.  
As we saw, consistently with his epistemological position, Hayek claims 
that only a system restricted almost exclusively to rules of just conduct can 
constitute a spontaneous order. In case of conflict, courts adjudicate the issue 
by judging the particulars of that case. According to Hayek (1982: I 72, 119), 
judges would then merely discover the existing law, never creating it. That is why 
Hayek preferred the common law over the civil law tradition. When 
adjudicating disputes, judges do not start from a rule posited by the legislator 
but from experience and tradition searching to apply such general principles 
that survived time to potentially unlimited new situations. 
Ultimately, to Hayek (ibidem: 94), the judge is “an institution of a 
spontaneous order”, precisely because when deciding he simply restores the 
order that nobody created but persists anyway. What is more, he does not aim 
at pursuing specific goals but is merely concerned with maintaining “what 
private persons have `legitimate´ reasons to expect” (ibidem: 98). In this respect 
he, the judge, distinguishes himself from the leader of an organization. 
On the other hand, civil law countries where legislation prevails have to 
be classified as disposing of law as an organization. Effectively, law is used as a 
FROM HAYEK’S SPONTANEOUS ORDERS TO LUHMANN’S AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 
 
56 
tool to advance and further specific social goals (the mirage of social justice as 
Hayek called it). The reason behind the predominance of legislation and the 
weakening of law derived from the concentration of the power to create and 
administrate laws on the same body. On the contrary, in the common law 
tradition, the parliament could only enact abstract and general rules and the 
courts were not authorized to create law but rather to apply it to the particulars 
of the case sub judice.  
Hayek held that the allocation of these two different powers to two 
different bodies is absolutely necessary to ensure the survival of the legal 
system as a spontaneous order. The issue is one of dynamics. If parliaments are 
allowed not only to create general rules but also concrete and specific ones 
tailored to the particulars of a class of agents; then because its members need to 
be re-elected, they will be forced to sell legislation to secure future votes. This 
process cannot be halted and more legislation will be enacted to the detriment 
of law and, consequently, individual freedom.10 
The critique here is threefold i) made rules are always prone to serve 
particular purposes of those who made them to the detriment of those 
individual plans that cannot be anymore pursued ii) they replace the 
spontaneous rules that survived because they served better human interests by 
rules designed by a specific class of individuals and iii) statutes crystallize the 
evolution of law.  
It is in this light that Hayek stresses how common law is far more 
abstract because abstract rules apply equally to everyone with little positive 
discrimination. The view of law as an organization to achieve specific collective 
goods is ultimately prey of the constructivist error, that we can guide society in 
the direction of progress through centrally made decisions and choices.   
Summing up, we could say that for Hayek only law as rules of just 
conduct can be said to constitute a spontaneous order. Furthermore, this law 
should be interpreted as a higher law determining a space of individual freedom 
that had to be respected by legislation. 
 
3.3 Updating Hayek’s empirical picture 
 
Hayek greatest fears have materialized. The trend for what he named 
“the law of legislation” has become unstoppable in civil and common law 
traditions.11 In his own terminology, rules of just conduct are now superseded 
by an infinite number of commands imposing to each one of us the (supposed) 
goals of the community we belong to.  
Most notably, public life has been conquered by the rights talk; every 
possible social issue can be framed in rights language.12 In the section above, 
we pointed out Hayek’s explanation of the phenomenon: bad institutional 
STUDIES IN EMERGENT ORDER 
 
57 
design allowing the concentration of the power to create and to administer law 
in the same hands which favored the diffusion of the idea that a democratic 
legislator ought not to have any limits when legislating because it would always 
be expressing the majority’s will. Crucially, legislation ceased to have to obey to 
higher principles of law; the Hayekian “rules of just conduct”. No more 
concern was voiced in determining what should and what should not be the 
province of law. From all that was exposed above, I believe it is fair to 
conclude that according to Hayek’s conceptualization, currently law is not 
anymore a spontaneous order but instead an organization.13 In evolutionary terms, 
law evolved into an organization. What are the consequences of having reached 
similar verdict for the understanding of contemporary law? Above all, what to say 




Let us then take the full consequences of last section’s thesis. Following 
Hayek’s premises we would be forced to conclude that law evolved into an 
organization type of order composed of commands created/made by a given 
authority to foster the goals of the majority. Individual freedom and use of 
information is curbed because legislation tramples the “rules of just conduct” 
or higher law. 
 Hayek’s account of the legal phenomena is open to many different 
criticisms. My goal here is to introduce its failures from a social theoretical 
point of view (I set aside a purely legal theoretical evaluation). By defining law 
as the spontaneous order that grounds the spontaneous order of the market; 
Hayek commits himself from the outset to study the place that law occupies in 
society and its relationship to other social systems. Still, one would ask: if law is 
an organization how can economy be a spontaneous order?  
In the following sections I first criticize his evolutionary explanation of 
law as a spontaneous order. Secondly, I question his understanding of 
evolution. Finally, I focus on the inadequacy of his conceptual distinction 
between spontaneous order and organization at least when applied to the legal 
system. It is very interesting that this central distinction has merited so little and 
critical attention among the followers of Hayek. The fundamental thrust of my 
critique is the lack of explanatory power of the distinction. 
 
4.1 Evolutionary Mechanism 
 
The first limitation of Hayek’s account of law can be grasped through 
the distinction between emergence and evolution/maintenance of spontaneous 
order (Barry 1982: b82 ff.).  
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 Hayek’s account of rules of just conduct as merely being the outcome of 
selective evolution among different behavioral regularities seems to me difficult 
to reject. Frequently, rules are obeyed by all of us without even being 
formalized or spoken out loud. So, let us take for granted that the spontaneous 
order of law consists of a set of rules of just conduct acquired unintentionally. 
 To Hayek, the complex self-regulating system could only be secured by 
courts. They had the task of protecting the spontaneous order. This is puzzling 
though. How can a set of rules/ideas, after their emergence, survive over time 
and constitute the higher law of a spontaneous order? In other words, what 
mechanism ensures the selection and retention of the appropriate rules among 
existing variation? 
 The evolutionary mechanism Hayek offers are judges; more precisely 
judges’ behavior. These rules of just conduct can be preserved because Hayek 
assumes that judges when adjudicating merely serve the spontaneous order 
without ever creating one (Hayek 1982: I 118 ff. “The function of the judge is 
confined to a spontaneous order”). 
Unfortunately, judicial neutrality has been empirically and theoretically 
rejected by different disciplines.14 For example, critical legal studies have 
emphasized that judges decide according to their own ideological premises, 
preferences and values. Law and economics has also stressed how judges act in 
the pursuit of their own self-interest. Legal realists supported adjudication 
based on the expected outcomes of the decision. Recently, Garoupa and al. 
(2008) and Landes & Posner (2009) have found a correlation between the 
political affiliation of constitutional/supreme court judges and their voting 
behavior. Political scientists also wrote at length on judicial activism (Stone 
Sweet & Shapiro 2002). If something, this evidence shows that we cannot 
assume that judges merely respect and repair the existing spontaneous order. 
Paraphrasing Montesquieu and echoing classic legal positivists that would 
reduce judges to the mouth that pronounces the words of spontaneous order. 
Bottom line, Hayek failed to provide a convincing evolutionary 
mechanism capable of ensuring the survival of the spontaneous order of law. 
In fact, as we have seen, legislation has triumphed over law in the course of 
history. Furthermore, if empirically judges actively pursue goals of their own (no 
matter which), then they cannot be considered an institution of the 
spontaneous order anymore. Instead, they act as an organization of the legal system 
according to Hayek’s own conceptualization since they can act purposefully, 
including against the spontaneous order of society.15   
Finally, even assuming the normative nature of Hayek’s account of law 
the last conclusions put him in great difficulties. Facing society dominated by 
legislation, Hayek’s goal is to go back to the golden age of rules of just conduct 
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as higher law. Yet, we have just concluded he offers no mechanism to do it 
debilitating his thesis on the evolution of law. 
 
4.2 Macro Evolution and Conceptualization  
 
Rejected the evolutionary mechanism proposed by Hayek to ground the 
evolution of spontaneous order it becomes clear that the conception of evolution 
that Hayek uses is also inadequate. In turn, the latter is crucially intertwined 
with his distinction between spontaneous orders and organizations severely 
affecting his treatment of complex systems. How? 
Typically, when one describes biological evolution it is common wisdom 
to say that evolutionary outcomes are unplanned, unpredictable and not 
necessarily first best (Darwin 2003: 445). Evolution has no purpose, it simply 
happens.16 However, there is still much discussion on the nature of cultural and 
social evolution because, obviously, man can try to shape and direct, through 
his efforts, the evolution of society and institutions. Furthermore, man is 
capable of defining goals other than human survival and today, in vast areas of 
the globe, institutional evolution is deemed good or bad according to manmade 
benchmarks such as values, economic indicators, happiness indexes…17  
Hayek uses an artifice in his evolutionary account of law.18 On one hand, 
he deems those rules of just conduct, behavior regularities that emerged 
spontaneously, the product of selective evolution because they fitted better 
human interests (concurring with my analysis see Dupuy 1988: 68, “In his 
evolutionary schema, the best abstract rules will sooner or later be selected. His 
neo-Darwinism […] provides him with a standard, a fixed point […]”). These 
rules as we have just seen favor an unpredictable social evolution because they 
give complete freedom to individuals to pursue their goals.  
On the other hand, Hayek deems undesirable the evolution of law into 
legislation. A contrario, he basically declares that the only desirable evolution of 
law is toward a spontaneous order, toward liberty.19 Ultimately, this is a 
teleological conception of evolution as progressing to a clear goal (Hayek 1982: 
I 55). And yet, he protested against steering attempts to direct society as a whole 
to a given goal.20 One could ask how we could get back to the spontaneous 
order of law without forcing individuals to be free thereby compromising their 
freedom. It is easy to see that like Habermas, Hayek wants to have both i) a 
purely procedural conception of justice and ii) a critical evaluation of its outcomes. 
This desire, however, is intrinsically contradictory. 
Our case study, the legal system, is probably the most suitable example 
to reveal the implications of these twin ideas of evolution and spontaneous 
order to the study of complex systems. I say it because law offers an example 
of the failure of spontaneous order if we take Hayek’s normative account of 
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evolution. A failure that Hayek acknowledged since he conceded that legislation 
(an organization) would have to be used to correct undesirable evolutions taken 
by the spontaneous order.21 Consequently, the spontaneous order of law is not 
a completely satisfying self-correcting order. It needs to be corrected by 
legislation which Hayek assumes is only enacted to restore the ideals of the 
former. Yet, in the previous section we have concluded that courts were an 
organization. I confess I am lost. What is, after all, the analytical and 
explanatory import of his conceptualization of law as a spontaneous order and 
organization? Isn’t law a complex system after all? 
Two points were made so far. First and foremost, normative logics of 
evolution should be abandoned (Teubner 1988). As we just saw, it is 
epistemologically difficult to justify liberty as the ultimate normative goal vis-à-vis 
other values. Furthermore, empirics help to reveal the lack of analytical power 
of such accounts. Second and related, the lack of analytical power is intimately 
related to the lack of empirical realism of the mechanisms necessary to achieve 
the desirable value. 
 
4.3 Normative and Institutional Dimension of Law 
 
The fundamental option Hayek exercises is the reduction of the system 
of law exclusively to rules22 leaving outside of it its institutional dimension. The 
rules of just conduct (property, contract and criminal) constitute the 
spontaneous order. Public law expressed through commands would constitute 
the organization of law. Is this a plausible account of law as a social system? 
 
4.3.1 Public/Private Divide  
First of all, the private/public law divide presupposes that private and 
public law can be easily distinguished and separated. This is a clear point of his 
lack of complexity in the treatment of legal evolution. Law evolved not only in 
the direction of legislation but also in the direction of fundamental rights. 
Private law is now surrounded by buffers (fundamental rights) which can 
trigger almost unlimited courts’ interventions. In this sense, the 
constitutionalization of rights coupled with the possibility of judicial review of 
legislation has made all private law public law. They are so to speak completely 
intertwined.  
Still, to this content based distinction we have to add the fundamental 
institutional nature of law which stands next to (if not prevails over) the previous 
one just elaborated. Before advancing, notice that in contrast to social and 
political scientists, I do not see institutions as sets of rules but more like 
organizations or agencies.23  
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Whether private or public, law is to be ultimately determined by courts. 
The legal system evolved in the direction of putting courts and not parliaments 
in its centre. Through the constitutionalization of legal orders, private and 
public law separation cannot anymore be maintained as Hayek believed since all 
legal rules risk becoming concrete and specific by action of courts. It is easy to 
understand Hayek’s maneuver. By assuming two bodies deploying two types of 
rules from two different branches of law and assuming everything static, law as 
a self-correcting system could perfectly be based merely upon the content of 
rules since its nature would not be changed by institutional interventions. After 
all, Parliaments enacted legislation to organize the government and courts 
corrected the spontaneous order. From the moment in which Courts are 
allowed to correct Parliaments and Governments, the nature of the rules from 
spontaneous order and organizations cannot be assumed statically and a priori. 
These are to be defined by courts.24 The nature of rules crucially mixes up with 
institutions.  
By focusing just on the normative dimension of law, Hayek 
conceptualization cannot capture crucial dynamics of the legal system and its 
elements, ending up seeing corrective interventions by legislation as an anomaly 
whereas they are part of law’s game so to speak. This is the reason why I am 
particularly unconvinced by definitions of institutions as merely sets of rules 
and evolutionary accounts which focus only on ideas as the unit of evolution. 
This might be partially true, but at least in the case of the legal and political 
systems, it simply ignores the fact that these are highly institutionalized 
discursive arenas and therefore in order for ideas to survive they have to follow 
and enter such durable institutional constraints and opportunities. 
 
4.3.2 Normative Nature of the Spontaneous Order of Law 
 Rejected the division of the legal system in two separate types of rules, I 
now turn to the analysis of the spontaneous order of law. Given the fact that 
legislation now predates law it is obvious that his concept of spontaneous order 
is essentially a normative benchmark. Even though, this conclusion derives 
already from Hayek’s belief that the spontaneous order of law consisted of a set 
of a-historical higher rules of law which despite its current disrespect still exist 
in ancient traditions: a type of spontaneously emerged natural law.  
Defining a complex system based on an ideal leaves me many difficulties 
to understand what we are really talking about. For example, what does it mean 
to say that democracy is the spontaneous order of the political system? Why the 
insistence that democracy is not its institutional dimension as political parties, 
the government and so on? diZerega wrote (1989: 5, 7)  
“Nevertheless there is a deficiency in Hayek’s comments. The democracy to 
which he refers is a government organized democratically. In this sense it is an 
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organization, although a fairly loose and even “disorganized” one. However, 
democracy is more than this; it includes citizens and institutions which in no 
very meaningful sense constitute the government. Voters, especially those who 
support losing candidates and issues, and the news media are not part of the 
government, but are essential elements of a democracy.” 
Isn’t it merely an attempt to save Hayek’s distinction when it cannot 
hold anymore like we saw in the context of law? DiZerega himself (ibidem, 
emphasis in the original) concludes that democracy is a spontaneous order as 
“the entire ensemble of citizens and their interactions when they observe the basic rules of 
community.” Why then not include organizations and their interaction in the 
complex system of democracy? 
 
4.3.3 Conceptualization Problems and their Source  
With the elements collected so far, we are finally equipped to sketch a 
decisive critique to Hayek’s conceptualization of spontaneous orders and 
organizations. 
So far we have seen that according to Hayekian postulates, 
contemporary legal systems are organizations and not spontaneous orders. We 
concluded that Hayek reduces the system of law to its normative dimension 
ignoring the institutional one. We have also seen that the concept of 
spontaneous order is of ideal nature, defining a sort of utopian (Hayek 1982: I 
64, explicitly uses the word utopia) ideal against which we can measure the 
performance of organizations.   
The decisive problem of Hayek’s conceptualization stems from the fact 
that he assigns the nature of complex system to social systems according to their 
ideological/value content and not according to their intrinsic systemic features. 
Indeed, according to Hayek’s conceptualization, only systems that put forward 
and respect his desired liberal ideology (his desired evolutionary outcome 
according to his teleological concept of evolution) deserve to be classified as 
complex social systems or self-correcting orders. All other social structures that 
pursue goals of their own have to be described and analyzed as organizations. 
The whole tension lurks behind the fact that he measures spontaneous order 
and organization against two different benchmarks. Whereas spontaneous 
order is evaluated as an outcome; organization is defined a priori irrespective of 
the outcomes that it produces. Hence, there is a clear methodological bias at 
play. Spontaneous orders are looked at dynamically, whereas organizations are 
conceived in purely static and immutable fashion. Artificially, Hayek denies 
looking empirically at the outcomes that are produced by organizations whereas 
he does so regarding spontaneous orders. In this way, his criterion for judging 
these two different phenomena is vitiated according to his normative 
preferences.  
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In my opinion, it is plain nonsense to claim that only liberal social 
structures can be complex systems as if complexity depended on the material 
content of the systems. And yet, this is the outcome of Hayek’s 
conceptualization. Instead, the focus should fall on the features of the system 
that allow it to evolve independently. Otherwise, we have the odd conclusion 
that a system of law respecting individual freedom due to judges’ respect for 
spontaneous order is a complex system whereas if judges behave purposefully it 
is not. 
The source of Hayek’s mistake is his deliberate insistence to associate 
complex social systems with a specific type of rules (abstract). It became very 
clear already that in the study of the legal system this does not make much 
sense. Still, I want to explore the point further. Hayek fails to perceive that 
complex systems work on two levels of abstraction. One is given by the 
interaction of complex systems with individuals. This is the dimension 
identified by Hayek. However, systems have also a life of their own including 
their survival and interaction with other systems. Because Hayek believes that 
de-centralized social order can only emerge out of individual action, he makes 
complex systems dependent on the effects they impose on individuals (liberty 
wise) ignoring the operation of systems at the system’s level. It is now obvious 
how Hayek’s teleological evolution crucially determines his conceptual 
distinction which in turn is vitiated to serve it. The consequences are 
tremendous. All social structures fostering a goal different than individual 
liberty are not complex systems but organizations. What can this mean?  
From another point of view, Hayek’s conceptualization is severely 
limited by his humanist premises or as Luhmann calls it by the XX century 
“semantics of subjectivity”.25 To Hayek and most authors society is composed 
by individuals, by subjects. Even his conceptualization of organizations implies 
a subject behind it: to pursue the purposes of the maker. So, we are forced to 
conclude that organizations cannot evolve independently of their leaders’ wish.  
However, once we escape this semantics, complex systems are to be 
defined as such because of their capacity to self-organize and self-reproduce 
themselves per se, autonomously from individuals. With this cut, the nature of 
rules of each system becomes irrelevant to their classification as complex 
systems. This opens up the door to consider organizations like courts also 
complex systems since it is not because judges pursue goals of their own 
through commands that courts as such are not complex systems. Organizations 
can have, while complex systems, an independent evolution irrespective of the 
goals established by their makers. Actually, this is in harmony with 
organizations’ literature which emphasizes how difficult it is to reform them. 
The point is that even if the leaders of organizations make rules through 
rational design, there is no certainty about their degree of implementation and 
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effectiveness.26 Human design cannot be evaluated a priori as Hayek naively 
does; otherwise you could easily predict our cultural evolution. The problem 
seems to be that Hayek admits of no alternative to human design and tradition 
(Hayek 1982: III 155). So, once we do away with the exclusivity of subjects and 
recognize the existence of systems,27 it is just a small step to admit that after the 
creation of institutions they follow an evolution of their own. Not that future 
intervention cannot affect it, but never in a 1-1 scale like Hayek assumed.  
 
 4.4 Final Remarks on Hayek 
 
Identifying the sources of the limitations of Hayek’s conceptualization 
helps to devise more easily ways out. I want to start by stating that even though 
I identify some limitations in the Hayekian general account of social 
phenomena I cannot extend, with all confidence, the results of my analysis to 
his treatment of different social orders. Therefore, my argument mainly applies 
to law as a social system. 
Secondly, I hope to have made clear that Hayek’s basic distinction is 
unsuitable to study complex phenomena. Applied to law, it would mean 
denying the legal system the nature of a complex system and yet law is 
empirically a self-correcting and complex system. What is necessary is to build a 
conceptual architecture that is capable of describing law as a self-correcting 
system including courts and legislators as organizations within it while 
maintaining the classification of law as a complex system. 
His conceptualization is also the reason why Hayek’s theory cannot be 
used to explore questions such as the interaction of complex systems or the 
interaction between spontaneous orders and organizations. Indeed if all 
spontaneous orders have to have the same content and the same structure of rules what 
interactions are there to analyze? What is more, if Hayek modeled them after 
the economic order, why aren’t all systems dominated by the former? 
Furthermore, if organizations (institutions) are conceptually diametrically 
opposed to the complex system as such, of course they have to be seen as 
harming spontaneous orders. Therefore, it is difficult to expand our knowledge 
of the interaction between spontaneous orders and interactions with such 
conceptual tools. Again, since the distinction is determined ideologically, 
conflict has to arise unless unrealistic assumptions are assumed as when Hayek 
admits the use of legislation to correct the spontaneous order of law.  
In a sense, the failure is more structural. Hayek’s distinction is not one of 
degree and it is here that it reveals its lack of complexity. It only allows a 
black/white analysis. Can the complex system of law be reduced to rules? What 
to do about professors of law, lawyers, clerks and many other institutions of 
law? If we reduce the analysis of law to rules advanced by courts and 
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parliaments aren’t we leaving out of the analysis a tremendous part of the legal 
system?  
It is my deep belief that the extremely accurate research questions 
introduced by diZerega (2008) implicitly assume the challenge I identified at 
length and are mostly directed toward a system-system level of analysis. 
Furthermore diZerega (1989: 11) ultimately asserts that democracy is a network 
where political information flows. This is clear evidence that the Hayekian 
framework is no solid ground for these analyzes.  
I interpret him as very perceptively assuming that complex systems i) are 
networks of elements which are connected ii) because they communicate the 
same information and iii) each element/node can differentiate itself. The seeds 
of systems theory are therefore already present in the literature of emergent 
orders and diZerega’s move is better able to capture the complexity of systems 
interaction in modern life. Although, after this visionary comments he does not 
give the next logical step which would take him to include for example political 
parties, governments, lobbying agencies as nodes of the political (complex) 
system. My contention so far, was that such step cannot be given due to the 
Hayekian conceptualization. Complex systems are complex and non-guidable 
even if composed by organizations precisely because they are an ensemble of 
ideas and institutions all of them communicating through the same type of 
information. It is precisely because democracy is not only an organization (the 
State) or 1 node only but a network that democracy is a complex system. 
With the growth of importance of organizations in social life it becomes 
imperative to adopt a conceptual framework open to their classification as 
complex systems abstracting of the nature of rules which compose them. 
Setting aside the Hayekian conceptual distinction seems necessary.  
These findings, however, do not leave us empty handed. In the 
remaining of the paper, I introduce systems theory as articulated by Niklas 
Luhmann with the purpose of showing that we already have robust intellectual 
resources i) to tackle the challenges herein identified and ii) to further the 
perceptive yet shy comments tried out by diZerega. The biggest import that 
Luhmann brings to debate is the capacity of his theory to apply to itself. We 
saw briefly in the socialist/liberal debate that Hayek refutes socialism but his 
theory fails to include an understanding of liberalism distinct problems. The 
same problem that we encounter with his basic distinction criticized here at 
length. It only admits one possible evolution. To be sure, this is not complexity 
or population thinking. What these two fields stress is the inherent openness of 
possibilities. Take democracy. Democratically we can prefer a welfare state 
against Hayek’s wishes. If he describes spontaneous orders as procedures then it 
is a sheer contradiction to criticize their outcomes whenever they don’t fit the 
procedural liberal ideal. Perhaps, though, the most important issue at stake here is 
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that, in such cases, his theory explains little of the working of the current 
system. That was our conclusion about his treatment of the legal system. 
 
5. Way Out: Running with Luhmann 
 
 5.1 A Theory of Society 
 
 As just suggested I argue that those interested in overcoming the 
limitations identified above should turn to systems theory, particularly the 
version developed by Niklas Luhmann (1995, 2008).28 Once overcome the 
initial reluctance of approaching such an esoteric author I am convinced that his 
theoretical architecture can provide crucial insights to develop the thinking of 
complex social systems.29 I use it, in the line of Michael King (2006: 41) 
because of “the possibilities that it opens for seeing things differently”.  
In this light it is fundamental to bear in mind that Luhmann’s priority is 
to create a new conceptual architecture that is capable of speaking meaningfully 
of a new type of society. The second crucial proposition to remember is his 
rejection of any evaluation of social statu quo. Things, society, could have always 
turned out to be different and so our present moment is as contingent as any 
other alternative state of affairs. 
 Systems theory starts with systems; it claims that society cannot be 
understood anymore as a collection of individuals/actions. Society is a 
communication system,30 distinct from human agents.31 This is neither good 
nor bad but an evolutionary outcome capable of coping with the increasing 
complexity of social life, that is, the tremendous volume of communication. 
 Luhmann’s assumption is that we now live in a functionally 
differentiated society (1995: 460 ff.). Society does not have anymore center or 
unity but instead is composed of functional systems, like the legal or political, 
each one fulfilling a specific function (necessary for society’s survival).32 Finally, 
ours is a differentiated society because social systems were able to differentiate, 
to distinguish themselves from society.  
If we remember that society is communication, what we mean here, is 
that each system manages one, and only one, type of communication. Law 
deals with legal communication, economy with economic communication and 
so on. This evolutionary outcome allows for the management of present day 
complexity. Each system deals only with a part of it and can thus specialize in 
it.  
 
5.2 Autopoietic Systems 
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 Classical thinking on systems theory conceived them either as closed or 
open.33 Closed systems could keep its unity/integrity but by closing themselves 
to the environment they failed to learn. Open systems had unlimited 
possibilities for learning and risking. 
 Luhmann conceptualized systems as autopoietic,34 meaning that systems 
became capable of controlling their reproduction through their own operations; 
being capable of autonomously defining their boundaries. In this way, 
autopoietic systems are, so to speak, open and closed at the same time. More 
precisely, they are normatively closed but cognitively open (Dupuy 1988: 55). 
They perform an operational closure (Luhmann 1992), which ensures that 
no external system can connect directly. On the other hand, this doesn’t 
prevent communication with the outside (Luhmann 1995: 37); instead it tells us 
that it is the system itself which defines the way in which operations from 
outside the system impact it. This is critical because in order to survive systems 
have both to preserve their autonomy (their difference from the environment 
composed by all other systems) and to be able to learn from the environment 
increasing their responsiveness to social (other systems) developments.35 
Systems perform their autopoiesis and distinguish themselves from the 
environment through a code. Each system has an exclusive code and each code 
is binary.36 They code communication and thereby reduce the complexity they 
have to deal inside their boundaries. For example, the legal system codes 
communication as legal (law) or illegal (not law).  
On the one hand, it implies that the legal system cannot be directly 
affected by the operations of other systems and vice versa (because not dealing 
with legal communication).37 Economic arguments concerning a monopoly for 
example, have to be reinterpreted in the light of legal provisions and weighted 
according to the importance assigned by legal procedure to experts’ testimony.  
On the other hand, it also implies that the legal system cannot be directly 
affected by individuals and vice versa. In the context of a dispute with my 
neighbour, if I want to use the legal system I have to file a lawsuit, probably 
hire a lawyer, and follow the legal procedure which determines which facts are 
legally relevant and so on. I cannot simply address directly the judge at his 
home and ask him for a legally binding verdict. 38  
 
6. Lessons from Luhmann 
 
 6.1 Systems Interaction and Evolution  
 
In a way we can say that Luhmann updates Hayekian evolutionary 
thoughts to the context of modern hyper complex societies. We just saw how 
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Luhmann interpreted the functionally differentiated society as the historical 
evolutionary response to the increase of complexity. 
 This functional differentiation, however, shatters the possibility of a 
united society evolving together to a similar goal. Instead, the picture is quite 
different. Every system fulfils its own function according to its own logic 
following its own path. Society is advanced through this de-centralized but 
parallel working of different systems. Actually, this is the condition to achieve 
more complexity. Consequently, evolution is necessarily contingent. While 
Hayek studies the spontaneous order at the individual level, Luhmann does so 
at the system level. In exactly the same way the market has no control over the 
development of society through individuals trying to fulfill their goals, society 
has no control of its development triggered by systems trying to fulfill their 
functions. 
The above said creates a rupture with Hayekian postulates. We cannot 
anymore anchor spontaneous order to the prosecution of specific and concrete 
liberal values. Otherwise we would be denying it the nature of a true complex 
system. From a systems theory standpoint the legal/ political and economic 
system cannot be seen as stably pushing society in the same direction. This 
would imply open systems that could directly access each other and develop a 
common program. However, if we accept they are autopoietic their interaction 
is far more complex than the one assumed here (more in a minute).  
At this point, I merely wanted to underline that systems theory enable us 
to understand outcomes of system’s autopoiesis and system’s interaction that 
go against specific goals. In this light, systems theory as elaborated by Luhmann 
does not perceive the Hayekian error of legislation enforcing the mirage of 
social justice in a negative way. First, this “error” enables new opportunities of 
evolution and triggers new changes in social systems. Secondly, legislative 
programs simply represent the working of the political system. They are the 
product of the political system. This says nothing regarding the impact of these 
programs in the legal, economic or any other system.  
 
 6.2 The Leading Question 
 
Luhmann’s conceptualization of systems as autopoietic seems to fit 
much better the purpose of better understanding law as a complex system. A 
complex social system does not need to be a spontaneous order as Hayek 
pictured it. We now understand better the source of the mistake. A self-
correcting/organizing system does not depend on the liberty it gives to the 
individuals advancing it. Therefore, once removed such liberty, the complex 
system also does not cease to exist as a complex system. The nature of a 
complex system is not individuals-dependent but depends instead on the systems’ 
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own features. Put differently, a complex system is not complex because of its 
content but because it controls the conditions for its autonomous reproduction 
wherever the latter will lead it to. 
 The Hayekian focus on subjects makes him trivialize organizations 
(institutions). This is exactly what Luhmann called the “semantics of 
subjectivity”. Once we focus on communication as the unit of our analysis it 
turns out that in addition to social systems also organizations can be 
autopoietic, complex systems. This possibility was hidden because of the 
subject taboo. In our age, “life” is not only biological but communicational. As 
we wrote, if decisions beg more decisions, then communication demands new 
communication. The structure ends up having a sort of functionalist reason.39 
In Luhmann’s chirurgic words (1995: 256, emphasis in the original)  
“If an observer attributes behavior to individuals and not to social systems that 
is the observer’s decision. It does not express an ontological primacy of human 
individuality […]” 
Of course it is the judge issuing the sentence, but there is more to it 
since he cannot guide individually the direction of the organization. In fact this 
was the departure point of this paper. Against Hayek, I started with the 
empirical claim that there are organizations in society that are self-referential 
systems. This produces a subtle but important change of basic question. When 
studying social phenomena we should not divide it among spontaneous 
order/complex systems and organizations as Hayek argued. We should simply ask 
if the structure under scrutiny is capable or not of autopoiesis.40 This gives us much more 
leverage since we are not tied to a specific structure anymore. As long as they 
fulfill this functional evolution, any equivalent structure can be analyzed as a 
complex system.  
 
 6.3 Law as a Complex System: Operations not only Rules 
 
 The identity of law cannot be given by a single value as Hayek tried to do 
with his rules of just conduct. The system of law has become internally much 
more complex than a set of rules and legal texts or any differentiation among 
private/public law (internal differentiation). Nowadays, lawyers abound as well as 
professors producing legal research, experts providing professional opinions in 
courts, legal clerks, courts, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and 
naturally pieces of legislation and rules.41  
This enumeration includes elements of very different nature ranging 
from legal materials and rules to organizations. Yet, what is common in all 
these structures is their use of legal communication. It is also the use of the same 
type of communication which connects all these structures. Law as a social 
system cannot be understood merely as a set of rules but as the constant flow 
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of operations using legal communication which determine the legal system’s 
boundaries (Luhmann 2008: 78). This is how we should understand the legal 
systems’ (or every system) unity and not in hierarchical type/stable/fixed rules 
fashion as Hayek does.  
I should pause to inform of the crucial change operated here: we move 
from law determined and defined by a form with given content and structure 
(abstract rules) to law as a set of operations which can carry whatever content 
and can be performed by whatever structures/institutions. The gain is huge since 
it allows re-capturing all elements that are left out of the analysis by the first 
formula (every operation other than abstract legal rules). Furthermore, it allows 
us to frame the future evolution of legal rules, institutions and doctrines: it is an 
open future. Certainly we cannot expect to believe that so many different 
structures and elements agree on a planning scheme to guide law unequivocally 
to a convergent point of arrival. If each judge or lawyer or professor can be 
seen to have a clear goal in the production a new rule or new opinion; at the 
macro level we cannot say that the gradual transformation of law is the result of 
purpose oriented activities (Luhmann 2008: 252). 
 This presupposes, as already mentioned, doing away with Hayek’s 
hierarchical understanding of legal system. His view posited natural 
law/legislation and adjudication reduced to the mouth of the law. With this 
representation in mind, it was easy for him to recognize that law is a set of rules 
and legal institutions do not contribute to the legal system in any other way 
than by enforcing and creating stable rules. 
 The conception subjacent at my line of argument is way different since I 
prefer to see the legal system as a sort of orbit around which several 
organizations exist connected by their legal communication. So they all 
contribute to the creation of the legal boundaries stating what law is. Lawyers 
through their practice influence courts’ decisions in the same way legal research 
and doctrine or experts’ opinion influence the action of the judge when 
deciding.  
In addition legal doctrines can import political communication such as 
the doctrine supporting the interpretation of statutes according to the will of 
the legislator. The whole point is that despite their influence they do not 
determine the action of the judge and yet they help to ensure a consistent 
interpretation of what law is. We could say the same about police forces 
practices of reporting crimes or accepting complaints or legal secretaries 
accepting cases being filed. All these practices influence and are part of the law 
as a complex system. Similarly, even though individuals and systems cannot 
directly access other systems, the latter are not immune to the former. Judges 
are naturally influenced by the media, public protests, social conditions of living 
and many other influences. Systems theory does not deny it; it merely states 
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that all these irritations have to be translated in the legal logic to be considered 
social communication; to affect the social system of law. Otherwise, if legal 
decisions do not reflect them; they could only possibly have affected the mind 
of the judge. 
 
 6.4 Center/Periphery and Time 
 
As Luhmann wrote, among this profusion of different elements and 
structures the centre of the legal system is today occupied by courts (Luhmann 
2008: 291 ff.). This does not mean that everything in the periphery is less 
important or secondary. But courts have necessarily to decide when cases reach 
them. They cannot deny justice and therefore they close the system saying what 
law is. As Luhmann put it, both legislation and contract are in the periphery of 
the legal system. For example political protests like environmental ones or 
demands for gay rights can become pieces of legislation or not. Transactions 
between ordinary people can become legally binding contracts or not. In practice 
this can be observed in the discussion over the legal value of letters of comfort; 
or the judicialization of sexual duties among spouses which gradually have 
entered the legal system and ceased to be mere private law in the sense 
portrayed by Hayek. The periphery of the legal system composed by systems 
like family, economy and so on provides continuous irritations that may become 
part of the legal system.  
This allows me to reconsider the example provided by diZerega (2008: 7) 
a propos of the threatening influence organizations could have toward the 
survival of spontaneous orders. He speaks of how credit card companies were 
able to change the bankruptcy laws so as to reinforce their position and power 
inside a given spontaneous order. From a systems theory point of view this is 
an oversimplified perspective. They couldn’t have done it directly. Legislation 
had to be approved according to specific rules even if lobbying took place. In 
addition, the enaction of legislation does not stop social communication about 
this event. This statute can be disputed on different grounds in court by 
individuals or companies. It can trigger public protests pressuring political 
organs to amend it. Complex systems won’t stop living because of this event. 
They will use it in new communications as the basis for new decisions. This is 
the potential offered by Luhmann’s conceptual architecture.  
Autopoietic systems and their different codes enable us to capture and 
follow to the last consequences social communication (even if there is no end 
state properly speaking because communication does not end). At this point we 
easily figure out how Hayek’s conceptualization is too abstract because it puts 
an end to the analysis. Let us take his argument of legislation as an 
organization.  
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His argument stops in the a priori category of command type of rules 
irrespective of how these rules empirically affect the organization’s evolution, 
other social systems and how they are continued by other means in different 
systems. Basically, his analysis of systems leaves out the temporal dimension. 
There are no reactions to the stimulus produced. 
Finally, notice that I am not demanding this chain of influences to be 
empirically carried out, but simply underlining that an adequate conceptual 
framework should give us the tools to do it. The truth is that these dynamics do 
not exist in Hayek’s static and a priori conceptualization.  
Final and most importantly, we should keep in mind that communication 
is not substantially political or legal. Communication is political or legal 
according to its coding by different systems. The same piece of information can 
be looked at in several different dimensions according to the point of view of 
the observer. Consequently, the same piece of information can originate 
political or legal communication. Again, materialistic metaphors are inadequate. 
This information is not physically contained within the systems but can always 
be appropriated by operations of other systems. 
 
 6.5 Courts as Organizations  
 
Saying that courts and organizations are at the center of the legal system 
requires us to elaborate a bit more on the nature of organizations. How do 
courts ensure the autopoiesis of law?  
Organizations, in Luhmann’s conceptual architecture, are centers of 
decisions. They communicate decisions. A decision is always a choice between 
possibilities, foreclosing ones, opening up new ones (Luhmann 2008: 283). Yet, 
most importantly, a decision connects past and future decisions. Through a 
chain of decisions, organizations develop a life of its own; they constantly 
reshape their direction. And yet it is impossible to say that they factually direct 
the system toward a rationally designed goal or plan.42 
The above paragraph can be better explicated by looking at the legal 
system. Courts produce decisions, sentences that have to connect to other 
sentences. Cases filed by individuals produce input to the system: variation.43 By 
taking into account not only past decisions, legal scholarship and research but 
also future consequences and decisions (confer last section description of 
irritations), courts’ decisions always operate a selection of what law is by 
discarding some elements and passing on others. The historicity of the legal 
system, the amount of legislation and courts’ decisions prevents that the entire 
system can be changed in a single moment and therefore decisions stabilize the 
system (ibidem: 259). They ensure the system keeps on running and working 
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autonomously while at the same time ensuring the possibility of learning 
without jamming it.  
            The last paragraph offers the connection between autopoiesis and 
evolution. Teubner perfectly summarized this link (1988: 232, emphasis added)  
“the emergence of autopoiesis signifies for the legal system a dynamic shift of the 
functions of evolution inwards; an internalization of the mechanisms for variation, 
selection and retention.”   
 Organizations as centers of decision which ensure the mechanisms of 
variation and selection seem a promising conceptualization of their own 
autopoiesis and evolution. For once, it definitely places the emphasis of 
evolutionary accounts on the internal workings of social systems recognizing 
their evolution is not dictated by the environment they are in.  
In addition they do away with a unique historical evolution presupposed 
by Hayek. The above paragraphs have made clear that Hayek’s 
conceptualization of spontaneous order and organizations depend on 
immutable structures of legal system; all deciding in the same direction. 
Luhmann’s abstraction of legal autopoiesis guaranteed by courts’ decisions not 
only puts organizations in the center of contemporary social life as suits the 
study of their future evolution by not crystallizing their structures or their 
content.44 They are simply decisions enabling any future path. What they do 
guarantee though, is the nature of self-correcting systems to organizations. 
As simple this move might be, it explains the way how autopoietic 
systems interact with each other in systems theory. The media system or the 
protest groups (organizations) irritate political parties which are part of the 
political system. However, protest groups cannot turn automatically their 
pretensions into legislation since they have to follow the logic of the political 
system and be politically successful (e.g. enact legislation). Their pretensions are 
dependent on, first of all, the decision of the parties to support them and 
secondly on the application of the political system’s code. Courts cannot also 
tell the legislator to regulate the matter unless prompted in any case. Still, even 
then, their mandate (assuming that can be done) has to be translated into the 
political type of communication and be the target of bargaining and negotiating 
which prevent the direct influence of one system onto the other. Each system 
can operate by means of different organizations and naturally organizations 
operate within different systems. 
The description above depicted seems to talk partially to Hayekian 
spontaneous orders and partially to organizations. There are two main 
differences regarding Hayekian spontaneous order, i) systems’ actions (through 
organizations) are the ones building (apparent) order and not individual action45 
ii) systems are also composed by organizations (and not only rules) which 
despite working according to their own goals contribute to the unpredictable 
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and unguided evolution of the legal system. As a consequence, the distinction 
between spontaneous order and organization seems even feebler once we grow 
complex enough to grasp the legal system as all operations carrying legal 
communication.  
It is now easy to see that it is Hayek’s deficient conceptualization that 
makes legislation’s intervention to correct spontaneous order an anomaly of his 
ideal theory. It is not an anomaly once we adequately conceptualize the legal 
system. Legislation is part of legal communication and can be put forward by 
the political system with a specific goal. However, this goal does not translate 
directly in the legal system but has to be reconstructed by the latter. In the 
same way, it is not because legislation posits someone’s goals that they are to be 
necessarily obeyed and pursued. As different systems have to filter external 
irritations into their own logic; human beings actually do the same. This can be 
seen in how often legal reforms fail completely to change individual behavior 
triggering new legislative reforms. Still, let us interpret it rightly. According to 
systems theory, such reforms and all other attempts to steer systems such as the 
passing of environmental legislation or compulsory education contribute to 
social change. However the relationship is not 1 to 1. We cannot say that the 




How could we amass the contribution put forward? Overall, I have 
argued at length that Hayek is not enough to ground a unified science of 
complex systems. 
First, I criticized the consistency, the explanatory power and the 
scientific nature of Hayek’s famous distinction, when applied to law, between 
spontaneous order and organization.   
This led me to reject Hayek’s definition of complex system. The 
complexity of a social system does not derive from the degree of freedom they 
grant individuals but from their intrinsic features. Social structures are not 
complex systems because they are liberal! As complex (capable to evolve and 
assume any content) they have the possibility to become liberal. I suggested 
that Hayek’s methodological individualism strongly limits his conceptualization 
at the systems level. 
I introduced Luhmann’s systems theory to overcome the identified 
problems. Next to individuals we have autopoietic systems capable of cognition 
and action (including organizations). Complex systems should be taken as such 
whenever they evolve to be able to control their self-organization and self-
reproduction. When applied to law, the theory of autopoietic systems helps us 
to configure the interactions of law with other social systems. Furthermore, the 
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description of courts both as an organization and an autopoietic system 
enabled me to present the advantages of systems theory to study the interaction 
between complex systems and organizations. 
All in all, the paper challenges current literature on emergent orders 
using a Hayekian framework and shows that the latter is no good to pursue 
some of the problems that are currently being dealt with. I hope that I was able 
to show how the questions that are now open can be framed in a richer way.  
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4 However, Hayek’s conceptualization of social order does not change accordingly. Similarly, actual 
social and political science research of evolutionary phenomena tries to understand contemporary 
social order and behavior by studying behavior in ancient societies. Can we really learn much for 
today’s life from, for example, the fact that human cooperation emerged because biologically more 
advantageable?  
 
5 Action is conceptualized differently by these two authors. However, since the point I try to make in 
the article does not depend on such difference I shall set it aside. 
 
6 See Hayek (1982, I: 102) “The task of rules of just conduct can thus only be to tell people which 
expectations they can count on and which not”. 
 
7 The tradition of spontaneous order is far older than Hayek, despite his fundamental importance for 
its revival. Barry (1982) offers a valuable historical account.  
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shall revisit this view later. Furthermore, human action seems to be perfectly represented by the 
individual interacting in the market. DiZerega (1989) explores critically this issue regarding the 
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9 For a summary of his distinction between these two types of rules see Hayek (2008: 125). See 
(ibidem, Chapter 10) for a more detailed treatment. Confer volumes 1 and 2 of his Law, Legislation and 
Liberty (1982) for the most exhaustive account. 
 
10 Hayek provides another argument. Such concentration of powers was not seen as undesirable 
because of the blind belief in a specific understanding of democracy that came to replace its ancient 
reading, “It seems to be the regular course of the development of democracy that after a glorious 
first period in which it is understood as and actually operates as a safeguard of personal freedom 
because it accepts the limitations of a higher nomos, sooner or later it comes to claim the right to 
settle any particular question in whatever manner a majority agrees upon” (Hayek, 1982, III: 2).  
 
11 Hayek (2008: 173) acknowledges that the common law tradition because offering more flexibility 
could also be more permeable to “the tendencies undermining it.”  
 
12 Hayek (1982, II: 101-107) was viscerally against the multiplication of positive individual rights and its 
crystallization on declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
13 Hayek digs his way out of this conclusion in a different number of ways, which I will dismantle in 
the following pages. 
 
14 Hayek would also have, for example, to disprove strategic use of courts by repeated litigants. 
Again, he assumes that individuals only litigate when the expectations protected by the spontaneous 
order are upset and never to obtain private benefits through the removal or creation of legal rules. 
 
15 As it will become clear later, it is no good to argue that the true mechanism is the maintenance of 
the doctrine limiting the legislative power of parliaments/executive to abstract rules. This doctrine 
cannot impede creative judicial behavior; especially today when courts are at the center of the legal 
system. One could also be tempted to blame unlimited parliament sovereignty for the pervasiveness 
of legislation. Yet again, this argument forgets that this is a legal doctrine and as such can be changed 
by creative courts. 
 
16 Mayr (2002: 82) called it the (scientifically wrong) ideology of finalism. Guttman wrote (2006: 10), 
“[…] evolution says nothing about progress”. We might say that the world grew more complex but 
calling it progress is quite a different thing.  
 
17 The problem in our contemporary post-metaphysical world is to determine which value should be 
given priority. Let us take as case study the failure of socialism. Hayek showed how socialism was 
self-defeating due to its unrealistic assumptions on the capacities of a body to concentrate and use 
information in a totally centralized way. Yet, he admits of no equivalent problems of a liberal order. 
Perhaps it ensures a better use of information but which problems does it create? From a systems 
theory point of view (Moeller 2006: 34-35), socialism is insufficiently complex since it assumes that 
one system (the political) can steer another one (the economy). More technically, the issue was that 
the political system by determining how the economic system is to operate applies its code instead of 
the economic one. So, economic plans were relevant insofar they were met or not met. True 
economic communication could not be used. Naturally, forged data emerged as the response to 
ensure the success of the plans. This is narrated in Ji Chaozhu’s (one of Mao and Shu En Lai 
interpreters) biography (2008). Yet, capitalism from a systems theory perspective raises other issues 
because it produces the illusion that political interventions can help the economy. Enough looking at 
 




financial markets to understand that they absorb whatever legislation can be enacted unless they are 
dismantled.  
 
18 Teubner (1993: 56-57) also criticizes Hayek’s picture of legal evolution. However, I find his 
criticism off the mark. Even though, he is right in saying that Hayek overvalues customary law; he 
wrongly accuses Hayek of ignoring the role that internal mechanisms of law fulfill in the variation 
and selection of rules. Re-confer my section 4.1. 
 
19 Norman Barry (1982: b 82) stresses Hayek’s expression “the twin ideas of evolution and 
spontaneous order.” 
 
20 Hayek (1988: 25): “This is another reason why evolutionary theory can never put us in the position 
of rationally predicting and controlling future evolution. All it can do is to show how complex 
structures carry within themselves a means of correction that leads to further evolutionary 
developments which are, however, in accordance with their very nature, themselves unavoidably 
unpredictable.” 
 
21 In blatant contradiction with Hayek (1982, I: 51, emphasis added) “We shall see that it is 
impossible, not only to replace the spontaneous order by organization and at the same time to utilize 
as much of the dispersed knowledge of all its members as possible, but also to improve or correct 
this order by interfering in it by direct commands. Such a combination of spontaneous order and organization 
it can never be rational to adopt.”  
 
22 In this respect Hayek follows a clear legal theoretical account of the system of law. Dworkin (1967) 
provides a good summary of the normative internal differentiation of law over time. The problem is 
that Hayek is not interested in a purely legal account of law. He studies law as a complex system that 
evolves in society. Consequently, he needs an account of law in society which he fails to provide: the 
place of law in the social order (and not merely the internal differentiation of the legal system in 
different types of rules). 
 
23 MacCormick (2008: 35-37) employs the concept institutions-agencies to address the same object. 
 
24 Instead of striving at Hayek’s goal of maximum freedom enabled by a type of rules, what this 
institutional dimension of law adds is a new question: how to maintain the confidence of individuals 
in their normative expectations? How does law reduce the complexity of social life and makes human 
interaction possible and meaningful?  
 
25 The post-humanism advocated by Luhmann is also clear in Michel Serres’ work (for example 2007: 
226), “The ball isn’t there for the body; the exact contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball: 
the subject moves around this sun”) and more recently in the ANT theory which became famous for 
its assertion that objects have agency. See Latour (2007, Ch. X). 
 
26 Hayek (1982, I: 45-46) admits that spontaneous orders can arise from man designed rules making 
my argument much less distant from Hayek than it could seem at first glance. 
 
27 Hayek wrote (1988: 6) “that socialists are wrong about the facts is crucial to my argument […]”. In 
my paper, I imply exactly the same in Hayek’s analysis. Hayek got it wrong. 
 
 




28 If Luhmann was the precursor, Teubner (1988 & 1993) elaborated some of his views, responded to 
criticism and essentially developed a milder version of systems theory. However, it lacks the 
comprehensiveness of Luhmann’s own work.  
 
29 His is an esoteric work due to the extension and surprising selection of sources he makes use of. 
Moeller (2006) aptly introduces Luhmann’s work and his place in the history of ideas. Geyer & van 
der Zouwen’s volume (2001) connects systems theory and sociocybernetics including many articles 
explicitly dealing with Luhmann’s work. Finally, King & Tornhill (2006) and Nelken & Priban (2001) 
discuss applications of Luhmann’s theory. 
 
30 See Luhmann (1995, Chapter 4 and 408, “for everything that is communication is society”).  
 
31 This is not to say that individuals cease to exist. Luhmann’s point is rather different. Human beings 
(bodies and minds) are autonomous and separate from social systems and therefore they cannot 
communicate directly meaning that social systems interpret according to their own rules the input 
provided by human beings whereas human being react to the input of social systems according to 
themselves (Luhmann, 1995: 210 ff.). It is famous Luhmann’s assertion that individuals do not 
communicate with each other, communication does. Similarly, Lacan (2008) once said that a marriage 
is two monologues. Finally, for the co-evolution of persons and systems see Luhmann (1995: 59 ff.). 
 
32 See Hornung (2006) for an accessible exposition of Luhmann’s functional-structuralism.   
 
33 See Luhmann (1995: 1-11) accounting for the differences between classical and autopoietic 
systems’ theory. 
 
34 See Teubner (1993: 70) for a synthetic formulation. Hayek (1988: 9) was aware of autopoiesis as a 
response to the challenge of “evolutionary formation of such highly complex self-maintaining 
orders”. 
 
35 Luhmann wrote (1995: 39) “In other words the system contains, as complexity, a surplus of 
possibilities, which it self-selectively reduces”. 
 
36 This way, complexity is shared among different functional systems each one specializing in 
managing and processing only one type of communication. For the presentation of each system’s 
codes and functions see Moeller (2006: 29). 
 
37 There are some stable connections between systems which Luhmann named structural couplings 
(2008: 381-422). These, however, do not entail the unity of systems.  
 
38 Naturally this description refers to the regular operation of the systems. Systems can be 
“disrupted” by revolutionary episodes, such as if the judges of the constitutional court are 
overthrown by the President with constitutional adjudication lying in his hands (the political system).   
 
39 The elaboration of this point would force a long detour. For the time being it shall suffice to say 
that Luhmann rejects a “monoculture of reason”. The semantics of subjectivity associated the 
existence of reason with the subject. To Luhmann, any system capable of cognition, of distinguishing 
itself from the environment, shares a functionalist reason. See Luhmann (2006) and Moeller (2006). 
 
 




40 In short, we should attest it as an historical fact (Nelken 1988: 206). This is exactly the focus of 
Biggiero’s article (2001) where he concludes that firms are not autopoietic systems. Teubner (1993: 
124 ff.) attempts to conceptualize “the legal concept of the corporate group as an autopoietic 
system” even though it is important to notice that he conceptualizes autopoiesis as a matter of degree 
instead of all-or-nothing fashion. 
 
41 This list is not exhaustive and far from definitive. Important is to remember that law also 
differentiated itself internally in diverse institutions and not only rules. 
 
42 Luhmann (2008: 81) identifies the source of irritation provoked by his theory with the fact that it 
says nothing about the “kind of structures that are developed” and nothing about “the normative 
programs that are developed”. 
 
43 In Serres’ poetic words (2007: 41, emphasis added) “A fluctuation, a noise, a spark of chance […]”.  
 
44 Courts are organizations in the same way political parties are organizations of the political system. 
 
45 If action is restricted only to individuals we would be denying the application of evolutionary 
theory beyond biological phenomena (Luhmann 2008: 233, footnote 10) leaving out of the analysis 




Barry, Norman. 1982. “The Tradition of Spontaneous Order,” Literature of Liberty, V(2): 7-58  
 
Biggiero, Lucio. 2001. “Are Firms Autopoietic Systems?,” in Geyer, Felix & van der 
Zouwen, Johannes (eds.) Sociocybernetics: complexity, autopoiesis, and observation of social systems. 
Greenwood Press: 125-140. 
 
Chaozhu, Ji. 2008. L’Uomo alla Destra di Mao. Longanesi. 
 
Darwin, Charles. 2003. The Origin of Species. Signet Classics. 
 
diZerega, Gus. 2008. “New Directions in Emergent Order Research,” Studies in Emergent 
Order, 1: 1-23.  
 
diZerega, Gus. 1989. “Democracy as a Spontaneous Order,” Critical Review,  
available at   
http://www.dizerega.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/DEMSPON1.PDF. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1967. “The Model of Rules,” University of Chicago Law Review, 35: 14-46. 
 
Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. 1988. “On the Supposed Closure of Normative Systems,” in Teubner, 
Gunther (ed.) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society. Walter de Gruyter: 51-
69. 
 
FROM HAYEK’S SPONTANEOUS ORDERS TO LUHMANN’S AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 
 
80 
Garoupa, Nuno & Garcia, Sofia & Grembi, Veronica. 2008. “Judicial Independence and 
Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal,” University 
Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-21 available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156281. 
 
Geyer, Felix & van der Zouwen, Johannes eds. 2001. Sociocybernetics: complexity, autopoiesis, and 
observation of social systems. Greenwood Press. 
 
Guttman, Burton. 2006. Evolution: a beginner’s guide. Oneworld. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 2008. The Constitution of Liberty. Routledge. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: the errors of socialism. Routledge. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1982. Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and 
political economy, 3 Vols. Routledge. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review, XXXV(4): 
519-30. 
 
Hornung, Bernd R. 2006. “The Theoretical Context and Foundations of Luhmann’s Legal 
and Political Thought” in King, Michael & Thornhill, Chris (eds.) Luhmann on Law and 
Politics: Critical Appraisals and Applications. Hart Publishing: 187-216. 
 
King, Michael. 2006. “What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?” in King, Michael & Thornhill, 
Chris (eds.) Luhmann on Law and Politics: Critical Appraisals and Applications. Hart 
Publishing,: 37–52. 
 
King, Michael & Thornhill, Chris eds. 2006. Luhmann on Law and Politics: Critical Appraisals 
and Applications. Hart Publishing. 
 
Lacan, Jacques. 2008. My Teaching. Verso. 
 
Landes, William & Richard Posner. 2009. “Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study,” 
The Journal of Legal Analysis, 1(2): 775-831. 
 
Latour, Bruno. 2007. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Lewis, Orion & Sven Steinmo. 2007. “Taking Evolution Seriously,” Arena Working Paper 
Series 19/2007. 
 
Luhmann, Niklas. 2008. Law as a Social System. Oxford University Press. 
 
Luhmann, Niklas. 2006. “Cognition as Construction,” in Moeller, Hans-Georg, Luhmann 
Explained: from Souls to Systems. Open Court: 241-260. 
 
Luhmann, Niklas. 1995. Social Systems. Stanford University Press.  




Luhmann, Niklas. 1992. “Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation 
of the Legal System,” Cardozo Law Review, 13: 1419-1441. 
 
MacCormick, Neil. 2008. Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.  
 
Mayr, Ernst. 2002. What Evolution Is. Phoenix. 
 
Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2006. Luhmann Explained: from Souls to Systems. Open Court. 
 
Nelken, David. 1988. “Changing Paradigms in the Sociology of Law,” in Teubner, Gunther 
(ed.) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society. Walter de Gruyter: 191-216. 
 
Nelken, David & Jiri Priban. 2001. Law’s New Boundaries: The Consequences of legal Autopoiesis. 
Ashgate. 
 
Serres, Michel. 2007. The Parasite. University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Shapiro, Martin & Alec Stone Sweet. 2002. On Law, Politics, and Judicialization. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Teubner, Gunther. 1993. Law as an Autopoietic System. Blackwell. 
 
Teubner, Gunther ed. 1988. Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society. Walter de 
Gruyter. 
 
Teubner, Gunter. 1988. “Evolution of Autopoietic Law” in Teubner, Gunther (ed.) 
Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society. Walter de Gruyter: 217-241. 
 
 
